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Abstract 
 
Internet of Things (IoT) have been disrupting 
industries through shifting novel services, and business 
models. Organizations should also redesign their 
business service models to navigate this disruption. A 
holistic understanding of digital transformation through 
IoT requires the cooperation of multiple disciplines 
ranging from engineering to economics. This paper 
utilizes a conceptual model to develop an analytical 
framework to investigate a number of pricing strategies 
enabled by different business models. Our findings 
demonstrate that the Internet of Things phenomenon has 
the potential to disrupt the way we do business by 
connecting markets and enabling new business models. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the world of ever-changing business models, 
organizations require utilize technologies to profoundly 
enhance their performances and to gain sustainable 
competitive advantage. Internet of Things (IoT) is one 
of the drivers of this digital transformation in this 
competitive age. Businesses are expected to meet new 
targets, seek new opportunities and avoid new threats as 
they face competition against connected services 
enabled through IoT. Digital technologies have changed 
the business models on many levels. First, these 
technologies created synergies among markets that were 
previously detached. They allowed collaboration 
through advanced and richer ways of communication. 
Technologies have also opened new horizons for new 
data collection, storage, processing, along with many 
other ways to disrupt conventional way of conducting 
business.  
 
Digital transformation is the implementation of 
digital technology applications that accelerate the 
business activities and competencies to leverage the 
opportunities. Searching, finding, and processing 
information became easier and cheaper because of 
digital transformation. It enhances effective and faster 
communication. Organizations that utilize IoT services 
can collect business data from sensors, and also 
automatically take actions without human intervention 
before service is impacted. [1] Organizations can use 
this collected information to achieve competitive 
advantages by improving business process and offering 
better services. [2] 
 
Digital transformation includes digitalizing the 
business operation, adopting technologies and thus 
changing the business environment. Embracing 
technologies and digitalization enable organizations 
advancing towards digital transformation. In the 
growing business internet-based technologies, IT 
operations limit the required expertise in order to sustain 
a competitive advantage. The need arises for 
synchronizing new operational technologies with 
existing administration focused information technology 
system. Converging Operation Technology and 
Information Technology ameliorate business 
performances, maximizes business efficiency and 
process management tools to have accurate information 
at a given time in its best form. The rapid and massive 
growth of mobile devices and traffic gives a good 
example of combining these two technologies in digital 
transformation. This growth allows people and thing to 
communicate faster at any given time and also, enable 
enterprises and government agencies to monitor and 
control digital devices remotely in real time. The 
integration of these two technologies create 
opportunities for businesses and provide greater 
economic benefit. Though there are some key 
challenges underlie this integration. Another challenge 
for manufacturers are for remote locations, limited 
resources, multiple technologies, mobility require 
remodeling the procedures.  
 
In this paper, we explore the driving forces and key 
challenges in embracing the IoT phenomenon. We 
develop a prospectus for new business models and use 
analytical modeling framework to initiate this 
transformation. 
 
Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59602
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Page 1618
1.1 Technological components of IoT 
 
Specialized computing tools of IoT make the 
principal layer of complexity. The first layer is the 
"Things". These are the autos, refrigerators, and other 
smart devices. To put it plainly, they are the ordinary 
tools that we use with no computing or information 
processing capacities. With the coming of IoT, we are 
transforming these non-smart tools into processing 
mediums. 
 
The second component is the Internet and 
corresponding hardware, software and service 
providers. Hardware providers produce the switches, 
routers, modems and other networking software 
required to provide internet services. Cisco, Juniper, etc. 
are examples of hardware providers. Software providers 
provide some of the software like switching software, 
speed optimization algorithms, etc., that are used to 
provide optimum bandwidth and speed. Finally, there 
are service providers such as Comcast, Frontier, Century 
link, etc., who provide internet access to both 
commercial establishments and homes.  
 
The third component is hardware that is required to 
enable the “Things” to use the Internet for 
communications. This hardware can be a part of our 
everyday objects that functions to collect data and 
transmit it to the platform. Hardware can come in 
various forms like integrated circuits, SIM cards, 
sensors, etc. Companies like Honeywell, Akita 
electronics, Samsung are examples of hardware 
manufacturers. 
 
The fourth component is the platform that provides 
the required intelligence to analyze the data and provide 
a decision. This is the heart of the IoT system and is 
responsible for collecting the data from the ‘Things’, 
store it in a database that is either local or on the cloud 
and is responsible for the analysis of data and 
corresponding decisions. Intelligent Systems from 
Microsoft, Internet of Everything from Cisco, etc. are 
examples of commercially available platforms. Of the 
four IoT components, the platform is the most complex 
and is the binding factor for all the other components. It 
collects the data from the ‘Things’, uses logic and 
intelligence to make a decision, and communicates it 
back to the ‘Things’ using the hardware and Internet.   
 
Taken together, Figure 1 displays the related 
components of IoT. The complexity of the IoT system 
creates more than a few market end-users. As such, it 
presents numerous combinations of ownership that need 
attention if an organization chooses to serve these users. 
To better understand these possible combinations of 
ownership we explore what constitutes a platform and 
how the components interact with each other in the 
following section. 
 
 
Figure 1. Technological components of IoT 
 
 
1.2 Offerings/sides in the IoT market 
 
Consumers are typically an important player in any 
market. However, in the IoT market, the term 
“consumer” is rather confusing. Consumers of IoT can 
be end-users of a system or consumer of a particular 
platform, device or service. For example, the end-user 
of any connected “Thing” is obviously a consumer. 
However, a car manufacturer (such as Ford) can also be 
a consumer when it buys Sync service or other 
intelligent solutions from Microsoft. To summarize, one 
side of the market can be a consumer for another. In this 
study, to avoid any confusion about consumer 
identification and market offerings, we will use the word 
“consumers” only for the end users.  
 
Figure 2 represents the connected offerings of a 
multi-sided market. The “Things” manufacturers are 
those producers that offer durable goods. These are the 
manufacturers of everyday objects such as cars, 
refrigerators, or vending machines. Examples of 
manufacturers are Toyota and Frigidaire. Typically, 
these manufacturers expect a one-time payment for their 
product. In a conventional market, strategies of durable 
goods manufacturers are relatively simple. For example, 
if the firm is a monopolist it can maximize its revenue 
and it is bounded by Coase theorem [3] in the presence 
of a strategic consumer. In competition, the firm can use 
the Bertrand model [4] to set a price, or the Cournot 
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model [5] to set a quantity and then solve for optimal 
strategies. However, if a market has more than two 
offerings or sides with network effects, as current 
research suggested, conventional economic approaches 
such as Coase theorem fails and market will not be 
efficient [6, 7]. 
 
Telecom platform providers offer 
telecommunication networks in various different 
technologies. For example, Verizon is a cellular 
provider and an integral part of the IoT ecosystem since 
the communication signals run on their platform. We 
categorize any communication service provider under 
the telecom platform category. 
 
Security is one of the main concerns in the IoT 
industry before customers adopt smart things at a larger 
scale. This requirement is similar to any other internet-
enabled technological market. Telecom providers will 
be the main player in the IoT industry to address security 
and privacy concerns of customers. Moreover, telecom 
platform providers position themselves uniquely 
between the customer and any other service or good 
seller to mitigate these concerns. 
 
Even though today there is a debate whether 
standardization can lead to a more secure IoT market, 
prior trends indicate that different IoT technologies may 
converge in the future into one standardized protocol. 
 
Consumable goods or services are another integral 
side of the IoT market. The main reason for a consumer 
to buy a smart durable good is the fact that it offers 
additional value in terms of consumable goods or 
service. For example, a smart fridge can order groceries 
without human intervention. Companies such as 
Amazon.com are already offering this service type with 
Amazon Fresh. However, there is a potential for any 
brick and mortar store to offer the same product or 
service to serve the IoT enabled grocery market. 
 
IoT presents an opportunity for advertisers to 
analyze consumers. There is a tremendous amount of 
data coming from each smart thing owned by a 
consumer. Sometimes that data can be large enough to 
be termed as “Big Data” and novel algorithms, 
computing power and logic are required. The 
advertising service has to analyze the data coming from 
all the data sources and communicate the appropriate 
advertisement back to the device. For example, in the 
future your fridge can recommend different brands of 
milk in addition to ordering it. This provides an 
opportunity for sponsored durable goods, which was 
rarely available in the past for everyday consumers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Offerings in the IoT market 
 
 
In this study, first we define the offerings of the IoT 
market and explain its multi-sided nature. Subsequently, 
we outline four different business ownership models and 
their strategies. Each one of these four cases can be a 
guideline for IoT researchers to develop analytical 
models. For example, in e-commerce, researchers can 
develop pricing models both in monopolistic and 
competitive settings. In operations research, supply 
chain and supply web models can benefit from our 
conceptual framework. Our aim is to investigate the IoT 
market structure and identify the market offerings.  
 
1.3 Problems not yet addressed 
 
We are motivated with the countless problems that 
are not yet addressed adequately both in academia and 
in the industry. For example, during our preliminary 
open-ended interviews, we quickly discovered that 
people’s ability to understand the changes and their 
implications were limited. It is apparent that the change 
the rate of human capability to absorb complexities. As 
a result, most practitioners do not follow a scientific 
strategy for their critical strategies, such as pricing of 
IoT services. 
 
IoT services are different from conventional 
technologies mainly because of their high-level of 
connectivity and the lack of human intervention. This 
requires new approaches for an organization’s risk 
profile. The sheer number of devices and their 
variability creates a complexity that’s never seen before 
in the past. Moreover, much of these devices connect to 
the systems outside a single organization. 
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For example, during our preliminary interviews, a 
high-level executive at a Fortune 500 organization (that 
considers itself an IoT leader) did not have a precise 
strategy for services pricing. This example is only one 
institutional component for sales and marketing. We 
observed this trend repeatedly for system management, 
analytics and even application development. 
 
To clarify, we explore these research questions: 
What are the institutional components of the IoT 
market? Which business service models and strategies 
are available for a firm targeting presence in the IoT 
industry? In addition to the theory, we provide a 
strategic model for practitioners to make decisions on 
presence, pricing, and supply web design in each side of 
the IoT industry: durable goods, consumable goods and 
services, telecom platform, and advertising. 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Internet of things 
 
The term Internet of Things (IoT) first originated 
from a presentation given by the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology researcher Kevin Ashton in 1999 at 
Procter & Gamble [1]. Currently, IoT term represents 
the “integration of the physical world with the virtual 
work of the Internet” [8, p. 1]. That is, the IoT is the 
network through which information resources may be 
shared between smart objects [9] and ultimately, to 
market entities in order to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which services are provided to 
consumers.  
 
To demonstrate the way information resources may 
flow across a particular framework to provide enhanced 
service, we describe a grocery service example. First, 
there is an object of interest, a refrigerator, with 
machine-to-machine communication capabilities. The 
object of interest has certain attributes, in this case, 
information about the groceries inside the refrigerator 
that are readable by another machine. Second, there is a 
device that interacts with the object of interest to capture 
and package information. In the case of the refrigerator, 
a monitoring device such as a sensor may detect the 
current contents of the refrigerator. Third, external 
devices are those machines that receive information 
from the monitoring device through the internet and 
translate the information into actionable data for 
managed services. The managed services can exist in a 
number of other markets.  
 
For example, a discovery service provider may serve 
as a data intermediary that connects data about the 
object to end-users [10].  The end-users may include 
service providers that react to the data, such as a local 
grocer that receives the information about a consumer’s 
refrigerator contents and triggers a delivery order to 
refill used items. Alternatively, an advertisement firm 
may receive information that generates a customized set 
of advertisements to be mailed to the refrigerator owner.  
 
As this example demonstrates, the flow of 
information across the platform effectively enhances the 
product-service offering. However, the network effects 
may be considered beyond the benefit to the consumer 
that owns the object of interest. That is, the IoT has 
essentially brought together different end-users that 
subsist on the information shared across the Internet. 
These types of network externalities have generated 
much interest in the way business service models may 
be created. 
 
2.2 Computing technology and the IoT 
 
Computer science and engineering research already 
have a considerable number of studies that define core 
IoT concepts and literature surveying the computing 
realm relevant to IoT [2].  
 
In our search, we noticed that security issues stand 
out as the primary concern for the IoT technology [2, 8, 
10]. As we identified four offerings in the IoT market, 
telecommunication platform providers appeared in a 
unique position, between the customer and any other 
firm offering IoT goods and services; therefore, they 
have the potential to address many of these security 
concerns. On the other hand, intentionally creating a less 
secure environment can enable fast growth similar to the 
case of the Internet [2]. 
 
Research direction for the IoT has a wide horizon 
ranging from massive scaling with knowledge creation 
and big data analysis informing the interactions with 
humans [6]. Deployment of energy efficient 
technologies may also continue to inspire green IoT 
research which investigates optimal energy usage. 
Although computer science and engineering research is 
extremely useful for technical progress, it does not 
address the practical need for a business service model 
to monetize the market. In other words, without 
improving knowledge about viable business service 
models we will continue to find new disappearing firms 
of the IoT industry that suffer the same fate as AltaVista 
and Netscape.  
 
Firms in the IoT-enabled industry need innovative 
business service models to survive and flourish. 
Although we found one conference paper investigating 
business model innovation [7], it was limited to the 
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service design processes in postal logistics. Therefore, 
we feel confident to claim that we are filling the gap of 
business service models and market presence strategies 
in the IoT industry. 
 
2.3 Multi-sided markets 
 
To understand the full complement of network 
externalities calls for a new perspective of the business 
service model. Past research has used the foundation of 
two-sided markets [13] to study a number of model 
designs and strategies with two markets (see progress 
report by [7]). A two-sided market can be defined as 
“one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an 
intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each 
set of agents effects the outcomes of the other set of 
agents, typically through an externality” [13]. For 
example, video game platforms connect players and 
game developers, and platforms that draw more players 
will attract more game developers and vice-versa. 
Researchers have expanded on simple two-sided 
markets to consider freemium models whereby one 
market receives a discount or free product to understand 
the tradeoffs of offering the discount or free information 
product to one side of the market versus the other [6]. 
Economides and Katsamakas [14] specifically looks at 
optimal pricing strategies of two-sided markets 
consisting of proprietary platforms versus open source 
platforms. However, researchers suggest that the two-
sided market may be too simple to represent real world 
company strategies [15]; rather, the networked 
relationships that connect multiple end-users should be 
considered. Building on the network effects of 
relationships between two user groups, we consider the 
way users interact with each other across multiple sides 
of the market. 
 
To understand business service models that 
incorporate the impact of information in a market with 
more than two sides, we consider at multi-sided market. 
In Table 1 we provide examples of multi-sided markets, 
specifically four-sided markets that extend previously 
conceptualized two-sided markets [16]. 
 
3. Model  
 
In order to represent competition in IoT-enabled 
multi-sided markets, we expand a classic two period 
Hotelling model [17] to j market sides with asymmetric 
market shares. We use this model to investigate how 
prices and market shares would change over time and to 
explain strategies for market envelopment though 
externalities. 
 
3.1 The Role of Hotelling’s model 
 
In this paper, we utilize the Hotelling’s competition 
model for a baseline to represent an asymmetric rivalry 
among to firms. We would like to underline that we only 
use the Hotelling’s model as an established method to 
represent the competition. We develop over this basic 
model through the representation of multiple sides in the 
IoT market. 
 
Please note that Hotelling’s model is an essential 
part of our formulation but it is merely used as a baseline 
to represent the competitive nature between IoT service 
providers. The focus, and the main contribution of our 
model is beyond Hotelling’s competition, which 
concentrates to characterize the multiple sides in the IoT 
services industry. As we outlined in section 1.2, 
numerous offerings in the IoT industry creates multiple 
sides in this complex market ranging from telecom 
platforms to the advertising market. In this study, we 
aim to develop the first stylized analytical model to 
represent the multi-sided nature of this digital 
transformation. 
 
As aforementioned in the abstract, our aim is to 
demonstrate that the IoT phenomenon leads to a digital 
transformation via disrupting the way firms do business 
by connecting markets. This connection creates multi-
sided markets and new business models emerge to 
create value in these connected-ecosystems. Leaders 
such as Amazon and Apple has the potential the benefit 
from these new business models, particularly via new 
pricing models and strategies to grab market share. 
 
Perhaps more significantly, these new business 
models has the potential to disrupt markets, along with 
creating new jobs or making others obsolete. Starting 
with the Hotelling’s competition model, we aim to 
demonstrate that conventional pricing schemes will be 
inferior to the multi-sided pricing strategies. More 
importantly, firms that understand and employ multi-
sided strategies will benefit from early capture of market 
share in multiple sides of the IoT-connected markets. 
 
IoT is a relatively new field and there are many gaps 
in research, especially in modeling IoT services and 
strategies. Ehret and Wirtz [18] recommend that vast 
business value can be mined from IoT services through 
scientific analytical models. In addition, Oberländer et 
al. [19] suggest that virtually infinite connections among 
devices and people could result in a new paradigm and 
complexity that could only be examined through 
analytical tools and methods. 
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3.2 Operationalization of the IoT ecosystem 
 
The notation used in this paper is in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Notation 
Term Definition 
u Customers’ utility 
i Firm index: i ∈ {a, b} 
t Period: t ∈ {0,1,2} 𝑐#  Cost of switching: 𝑐#	~	U[0, θ]	 
e Network effect on u 
j Market side index: j ∈ {1, 2, 3} 
α Marginal shifting cost  𝑝-.  Price of firm i in period t 𝑞-.  Quantity sold by firm i in period t 𝑥.  Distance from buying the service from firm i 
 
The IoT-enabled market are served by two firms (𝑎 
and 𝑏) with asymmetric initial market shares: 
 0 ≤ 𝑞45 < 0.5 < 𝑞49 ≤ 1 
 
The asymmetric market share assumption benefits 
the model in two ways. First, it provides a more realistic 
representation of current IoT-enabled markets. Second, 
it covers a wider range of theoretical scenarios than an 
equal-market-share case. 
 
We also assume that, in the market setting above, 
there is a continuum of customers uniformly distributed 
between firms a and b. This horizontal differentiation 
(which indicates that IoT-enabled service characteristics 
across a market side are fixed) is due to inherent 
characteristics of IoT services (such as customer taste, 
ease of operation, configurability, compatibility and 
security perception) rather than the physical location.  
 
In our model setup, there are i firms in j sides of the 
market. Multi-sided markets develop over time, 
generally with the introduction of a disruptive 
technology because network externalities require time 
to affect a market. [15] For example, it took 
Amazon.com years to develop a viable electronic book 
reader platform and benefit from synergies on both sides 
(e-reader and e-book) of the publication market. 
Therefore, most multi-sided markets start with 
independent organizations serving each side. The best 
representation of a pre-competition multi-sided market 
is the case where firms independently serve separate 
sides of the market. 
 
We consider a two-period pricing game with two 
firms. Price 𝑝-. represents the price of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
Customers make purchase decisions based on their 
utilities. The term	x. is the distance of the customer 
buying the service from firm 𝑖. In addition, the term c?	represents any costs incurred to switch. The initial 
picture looks as shown in figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the initial condition for the model 
 
For simplicity, we denote 𝑒AA	as e, and omit the 
subscript 𝑗 in 𝑝C-.  and 𝑞C-. . The net utility of the 
indifferent customer for firm a in the second period can 
be characterized as: 
 𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥9 − 𝑝G9 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =	𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥9) − 𝑝G5 − 𝑐#9 + 𝑒𝑞A5 
 
The indifferent customer determines new market 
shares for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period. 
 
We use backward induction to find equilibrium 
prices and quantities sold to represent market shares. 
First, we start with the second period solution, and then 
we solve the maximization problem for the first period 
profits to find equilibrium prices and quantities sold. As 
mentioned in table 1, 𝑞-. denotes quantity sold by firm 𝑖 
in period 𝑡. 
 
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent customer in the 
second period is: 
 𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥5) − 𝑝G5 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =	𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥5 − 𝑝G9 − 𝑐#5 + 𝑒𝑞A5 
 
We can determine the new allocation of market share 
for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 at the end of the second period by 
determining the quantity of switching customers. To 
find market shares for the second term, we start by 
identifying customers who switch: 
 
Customers will switch from firm 𝑎 to firm 𝑏 when 𝑐#9 < α(2xN − 1) + pGN − pGP + 𝑒(𝑞A5 − 𝑞A9). Similarly, 
firm 𝑏 customers switch to firm 𝑎 when 𝑐#5 <𝛼(1 − 2𝑥5) − 𝑝G9 + 𝑝G5 + 𝑒(𝑞A5 − 𝑞A9). Please note that 
switching cost can be different for each customer since 
it is a distribution. Such switching costs bring additional 
trade-offs over the heterogeneity of tastes. For example, 
consider two customers where one is closer to firm 𝑎 in 
𝑎 𝑏 𝑞0𝑏  𝑞0𝑎  0 1 
𝑎 𝑏 𝑞0𝑏  𝑞0𝑎  0 1 
Side 1 
 Side j 
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tastes. Normally we would expect the closer customer 
to stay with firm 𝑎 and the farther customer to switch, 
however, if the closer customer’s switching cost is low, 
and the farther customers switching cost is high, then the 
farther customer can stay with the firm because of high 
switching costs and the closer customer may switch to 
the rival’s service. 
 
We assume that 𝛼 < 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 to avoid the negative 
probability of switching and an interior location 𝑥 for 
the customer. This assumption not only improves 
tractability in the general model, but also it is a better 
representation of reality. Price 𝑝 in our model includes 
inherent penalties of switching, therefore a customer’s 
switching cost will be less than the price difference, or 
else the customer would not switch. These conditions 
are checked for all possible cases (negative and positive) 
of optimal solutions. 
 
Let 𝑛-CRS be the quantity of customers who bought 
from 𝑙 in period 𝑡 − 1, and firm k in period 𝑡, in market 
side j. For example, customers who switched to firm 𝑏 
from firm 𝑎 in period 2 are represented as 𝑛GC59. 
Therefore, customers staying with firm 𝑎 can be found 
through the following calculation: 
 𝑛GC99 = U V U 1𝜃XY(GZ[A)\]_^[]^`\a(bc`[bc_) 𝑑𝑠f 𝑑𝑥
bc_
4  
 
 = 𝑞A9(𝛼(1 − 𝑞A9) − 𝑝G9 + 𝑝G5 + 𝑒(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5) + 𝜃)𝜃  
 
Customers switching from firm 𝑎 to 𝑏: 
 𝑛GC59 = 𝑞A9 − 𝑛GC99 
 = 𝑞A9(𝛼(𝑞A9 − 1) + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 − 𝑒(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5))𝜃  
 
Customers staying with firm 𝑏: 
 𝑛GC55 = UV U 1𝜃XY(A[GZ)[]_^\]^`\a(bc`[bc_) 𝑑𝑠f𝑑𝑥
A
bc_  
 = (𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9(𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞A5𝑒 + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 + 𝜃)𝜃  
 
Customers switching from firm 𝑏 to firm 𝑎: 
 𝑛G95 = 1 − 𝑞A9 − 𝑛G55 
 = (𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9(𝛼 + 𝑒) − 𝑞A5𝑒 + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5)𝜃  
 
Market share for firm 𝑎 at the end of period 2: 
 𝑞G9 = 𝑛G99 + 𝑛G95 
 = 𝑞A9 + 𝑝G5 − 𝑝G9 + 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5)𝜃  
 
Market share for firm 𝑏 at the end of period 2: 
 𝑞G5 = 𝑛G55 + 𝑛G59 
 = 1 − 𝑞A9 + 𝑝G9 − 𝑝G5 − 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5)𝜃  
 
Firm	𝑖 maximizes its second period profit. 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥] 	 𝜋G. = 𝑝G. 𝑞G.  
 
First order conditions give us equilibrium prices as: 
 𝑝G9∗ = (1 + 𝑞A9)𝜃 + 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5)3  
 𝑝G5∗ = (2 − 𝑞A9)𝜃 − 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5)3  
 
Equilibrium quantities sold are: 
 𝑞G9∗ = (1 + 𝑞A9)3 + 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5)3𝜃  
 𝑞G5∗ = (2 − 𝑞A9)3 + 𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5)3𝜃  
 
As a result of the second period profit maximization, 
we obtain profits as a function of quantities sold in the 
first period: 
 πGN∗ = (𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5) + (1 + qAN)θ)G9θ  
 πGP∗ = (𝑒(2𝑞A9 − 1)(𝑞A9 − 𝑞A5) − (2 − qAN)θ)G9θ  
 
For the first period maximization problem, we 
follow a process similar to the second period. First, we 
identify the indifferent customers to find switching costs 𝑐# in terms of 	𝑥.  and prices. 
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The net utility of the indifferent customer for firm 𝑎 
in the first period is: 
 𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥9 − 𝑝A9 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =	𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥9) − 𝑝A5 − 𝑐# + 𝑒𝑞A5 
 
The net utility of firm 𝑏’s indifferent customer is: 
 𝑢 − 𝛼(1 − 𝑥5) − 𝑝A5 + 𝑒𝑞A9 =	𝑢 − 𝛼𝑥5 − 𝑝A9 − 𝑐# + 𝑒𝑞A5 
 
Subsequently, we solve the maximization problem 
for the first period profits to find equilibrium prices and 
quantities sold. Tracing previous steps shows that there 
are optimal pricing strategies for firm 𝑎 and 𝑏 in the 
basic model. 
 
Theorem: There exists a solution for the maximum 
revenue in IoT-enabled markets, thus there are rational 
pricing strategies for firms 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
 
Proposition 1: Cross-market externalities increase 
the benefits to the market leader in terms of quantities 
sold. 
 
Proposition 2: The market leader can charge a 
higher price in the presence of positive cross-market 
externalities without losing market share. 
 
Please note that these results only hold for the 
market share leader firm, because the externality effects 
across time periods conflict with the inter-market 
externality effects for the follower firm. 
 
3.3 Industry examples 
 
We are already observing the assembly of multiple 
market sides through various IoT service offerings and 
devices. A few days ago (in September 2018,) Amazon 
announced that it will start selling multiple IoT-enabled 
devices including a connected smart microwave oven 
that is voice controlled, learning and responding with its 
proprietary personal assistant Alexa. This device is 
more than a simple internet-connected plaything for 
geeks. It has the potential to connect the grocery, 
durable goods, and the advertising industries (if not 
more.) In the near future, we speculate that Amazon will 
offer more IoT-enabled durable goods for home and car. 
For example, our refrigerators and coffee makers will 
start to talk and collect data. Interestingly, the pricing of 
these devices will be well below the cost, as we 
predicted in our stylized model. 
 
We are essential in the round 1 of this IoT-enabled 
pricing and market share strategy game. It is not too late 
for other firms to follow early movers such as Amazon. 
However, if a competitor waits too long, it can 
completely miss the window to benefit from IoT-
enabled markets. The impact of Internet of Things are 
much more than technological sensors and voice 
recognition. IoT-enabled services has the potential to 
disrupt conventional industry such as groceries, that are 
previously thought to be relatively safe from digital 
transformation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Our vision of the future IoT industry includes a firm 
or a set of firms that appreciate the multi-tiered nature 
of the market we presented in this study. At the extreme, 
a firm can still benefit from other complementary 
offerings while providing free goods and services to the 
customer. For example, it would not surprise us to see a 
smart refrigerator dominating every household because 
it is sold considerably under its cost with the expectation 
of groceries or other consumable goods and services 
paying for the difference along the way. Likewise, both 
this refrigerator and groceries can be subsidized via 
household consumption data collected from the smart 
device, similar to Google providing a free search service 
based on advertising. In either case, customers enjoy 
lowered costs while the strategic firm enjoys market 
domination, and scalable revenues stemming from the 
complementarities in this multi-sided market. On the 
negative side, this business service model has the 
potential to disrupt a number of industries including 
durable goods, retail, and even telecommunication. 
 
Each case in our service design models provides a 
theoretical guideline for prospective research and 
presents an opportunity for future studies in various 
fields such as information goods pricing models, supply 
chain design, and policy development for potentially 
inefficient IoT markets. Beyond, IoT industry, our 
concepts can be used for any information systems 
enabled market complex enough to serve four different 
sides. 
 
In addition to the theory, practitioners in the IoT 
industry are in dire need of strategic business ownership 
models because conventional models do not fully 
capture externalities and the multi-sided nature of this 
market. Using our framework, practitioners can decide 
if they want to offer products and services in each side 
of the IoT market. Before they consider this decision, 
they can compare aforementioned pros and cons of each 
case. Early ownership decisions for each side of the IoT 
market can mean market domination for a firm or being 
the next failure in a disrupted industry. 
 
Page 1625
For example, a marketing manager at an IoT services 
organization such as Amazon could utilize our model to 
price their IoT-enabled services both in the basic case 
and in the presence of time-inconsistent discounters. In 
such a case, we expect to see highly-discounted durable 
goods in the short run in order to dominate the market. 
For example, Amazon could deliver IoT-enabled smart 
refrigerators at cost or even at a loss which could be 
subsidized by the groceries or by the other sides of this 
complex market. 
 
On the other hand, the competition is obviously is at 
a disadvantage in this setting. This might force 
competitors to form alliances in order to gain 
competitive advantage and benefit from the economies 
of scale. For example, we wouldn’t be surprised to see 
IoT alliances between durable goods manufacturers 
(such as Samsung) and retailers (such as Walmart) in the 
near future. 
 
This research has limitations due to the nature of the 
conceptual model research methodology. First, 
arguments and propositions in this study have not been 
tested empirically or any other method. Furthermore, 
conceptual models naturally adopt certain aspects in the 
cultural literature. Therefore, the arguments in this paper 
should be taken as mere propositions until they are 
scientifically proven. 
 
This work can be extended as we observe how the 
IoT industry develops and create business service 
models more specific to address the needs of the 
customers, organizations and institutions. 
 
Future research on IoT business service models are 
not limited to pricing and supply chain models. 
Petabytes of “Big Data” generated through advertising 
side of the IoT market will create an opportunity of 
novel empirical marketing research and even novel 
theories. 
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